The UK Economic Constitution after Brexit: Between Authoritarianism and Democracy

Inspired from recent events, such as the resignation of the United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister following a negative assessment of the autumn 2022 mini-budget, as well as the legislative intervention in the wave of trade disputes with the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill, this paper investigates the analytical value of the notion of the economic constitution. This notion can be used to examine the relationship between economic management and democratic processes but has not been adequately elaborated upon in the UK context. Nevertheless, constitutional theorists have used it to examine the European Union (EU) constitutional structure, which has been assessed as an example of authoritarian economic constitutionalism. Through a comparative juxtaposition to the EU economic constitution, this paper seeks to evaluate the authoritarian or otherwise characteristics of the UK economic constitution. It does so by focusing on two aspects of the UK economic constitution, namely fiscal monitoring and labour legislation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the potential for reforming the economic constitution in a more democratic direction in the post-Brexit UK.